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The solution of the mind-body problem as the problem of interrelation and interconditionality of 
mental and physiological faces contradictions when one proceeds from the classical subject-object 
opposition. Accepting the subject-object opposition only as the convenient way for a scientist to 
speak about the phenomena of this world (the way that shouldn’t be equal to the world itself), it is 
already senseless to look for the reason of a mental event neither in biology nor in sociality. The 
subject-object opposition itself is possible, because the event of proportionality of human being 
and world have happened. In this event the human being and the world are defined by a finite way 
and until it neither the human being, nor the world can’t be defined. The human physiology (as 
well as a sociality which is sometimes unfairly identified with spirituality) can be considered as a 
marker of such definiteness, it is minimum of the being of consciousness. However in addition to this 
minimum there is also another aspect. Indeed, in every act of perception two events are realized 
simultaneously (not in a sequence): perception of a certain seeming (what is possible if human 
being and world are already defined, i.e. the act of proportionality of human being and world have 
happened) and a certain content. The content is always related to a certain idea. Ideas, in its turn, 
can be subdivided into two classes. To the first we will attribute the ideas which are the result of 
generalization of preceding experience and which give an opportunity to speak in an ordered way 
about the phenomena of the surrounding world. But there are also ideas of another sort – those 
that give an opportunity to the human being to newly re-create himself each time in the complete 
and ordered state. These ideas organize human life as human one, they are initiated by culture, but 
they are not a result of generalization. Such are a conscience, good, moral, love and the similar 
phenomena for which there are no external reasons – here the basis of a phenomenon coincide with 
the phenomenon itself.
So, human physiology (including work of human brain) is the only side which characterizes the minimum 
of life of consciousness, it is the marker of human being and world are defined now. We are always after 
this definiteness (or, more precisely, inside it) when we perceive events of the world, and one shouldn’t 
search the conditions of any event of life of consciousness (the point of interests of ontology) neither 
in biology nor in sociality. Every conscious act is complete and self-sufficient, and the consciousness 
basis (being actually the basis of human being) can be found only in consciousness.
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Introduction
In the first half of the XX century M. Scheler 
fairly noticed that “in no historical era has the 
human being become so much of a problem to 
himself as in ours” (Scheler, 1927/2009, p. 5). 
Almost a century later it is possible to claim 
firmly that the problematical character of the 
human being doesn’t disappear anywhere. The 
discourse about the human being still contains 
more questions, than answers. One of such 
questions without an unambigiuous answer is the 
mind-body problem which can be expressed as 
follows: how is the work of human consciousness 
connected with the structure of human brain?
The mind-body problem is considered now 
from the position of various theoretical approaches. 
The detailed review of such approaches is provided 
by K. Ludwig (Ludwig, 2003). Ludwig allocates 
four statements which, according to his opinion, 
look plausible, but at the same time can’t be true 
at once because they are contradicting each other: 
“1 Realism. Some things have mental properties. 2 
Conceptual autonomy. Mental properties are not 
conceptually reducible to non-mental properties, 
and, consequently, no non-mental proposition 
entails any mental proposition. 3 Constituent 
explanatory sufficiency. A complete description 
of a thing in terms of its basic constituents, their 
non-relational properties, and relations to one 
another and to other basic constituents of things, 
similarly described (the constituent description) 
entails a complete description of it, i.e., an 
account of all of a thing’s properties follows 
from its constituent description. 4 Constituent 
non-mentalism. The basic constituents of things 
do not have mental properties as such” (Ludwig, 
2003, pp. 10-11). Further classification of 
theoretical approaches to the mind-body problem 
is built by Ludwig depending on acceptance or 
non-acceptance of one or another statement 
listed above. It includes a number of concepts 
(and their versions): eliminativism, conceptual 
reductionism, conceptual anti-reductionism, 
ontological anti-reductionism (Ludwig, 2003, 
p. 13). Without the purpose to consider each 
of the designated concepts in detail (Ludwig 
makes this), we note the following. Without 
accounting solipsism (universal pure “mental 
particle theory” in Ludwig’s terminology) which 
Ludwig considers as a kind of realism, all other 
concepts listed by him are fully laid within two 
groups allocated earlier by J. Fodor: “Traditional 
philosophies of mind can be divided into two 
broad categories: dualist theories and materialist 
theories. In the dualist approach the mind is a 
nonphysical substance. In materialist theories the 
mental is not distinct from the physical; indeed, 
all mental states, properties, processes and 
operations are in principle identical with physical 
states, properties, processes and operations” 
(Fodor, 1981, p. 124). It seems that such division 
really reflects the representations developed in 
modern philosophy.
It must be noted that both dualistic and 
materialistic approaches face certain difficulties 
in the explanation of the mind-body problem. At 
first sight, the materialistic theories are supported 
by science progress. Indeed, neurobiology 
in the XX century established that the brain 
percepts external signals by means of impulse 
polarization on all neural network, including 
the brain itself (Hubel, 1988). A variety of 
specializations of a neural network gives human 
dimension, in which the direct perception of 
one outward things is possible by means of 
sense organs, but it is impossible for other 
outward things (for example, infrared radiation 
or ultrasound). Besides, scientists discovered 
functional asymmetry of cerebral hemispheres. 
In particular, many researchers pay attention that 
the left hemisphere of a brain generally carries 
out abstracting activity, makes operations with 
abstract and ideal objects, while the work of the 
right hemisphere correlates with creative thinking 
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(Ivanov, 1978; Chernigovskaia & Deglin, 1986; 
Geodakian, 1993; Merkulov, 1999; Deglin, 2001; 
Geodakian, 2005). In turn, T. A. Dobrokhotova 
and N. N. Bragina assume the interesting thing: 
the hemispheres of a brain function in the 
present so that the right hemisphere represents 
the past and the left hemisphere is involved in 
conceivableness of the future (Dobrokhotova & 
Bragina, 1986). A. N. Parshin draws a conclusion 
using the research of T. A. Dobrokhotova and 
N. N. Bragina that “the right hemisphere is 
more disposed to sensory actions, and the left 
is disposed to motor actions” (Parshin, 2001, p. 
95). On the whole practically all highest mental 
functions (perception, memory, speech etc.) 
are implemented by right and left hemispheres 
differently (Hellige, 1993; The Asymmetrical 
Brain, 2004).
Thus, the brain functional activity indicates 
certain somatic pre-conditions of conscious 
activity of a human being. Philosophers couldn’t 
help being interested in it. As a result the great 
number of naturalistic concepts of consciousness 
was created, up to the so-called theory of identity 
of consciousness and brain according to which 
the mental event is identical to some event or 
state in a brain in a literal sense (Priest, 1991). 
But at the same time even adherents of the theory 
of identity generally deny that statements about 
consciousness mean the same as statements 
about processes in a brain (Priest, 1991, p. 
102). There is the gap between the languages 
describing subjective feelings of a human being 
and physiological processes in his body, and 
overcoming of this gap is hardly possible now. In 
our opinion, T. Nagel characterizes this situation 
rather precisely: “…We cannot see how a detailed 
account of what is going on in the brain could 
exhaustively explain the taste of a cigar – not even 
if we could see how it explained all the physical 
effects of such an experience” (Nagel, 1998, p. 
343). Let us emphasize that the comprehension of 
conscious experience is usually understood as a 
task of philosophy, and the description of brain 
functions is built in a science discourse. Then it 
really turns out, as B. V. Markov notes, that “the 
scientific and philosophical discourses about a 
human being are incommensurable (our italics. – 
D. K.), herewith a biological knowledge about a 
human being describes ideal objects as well as 
philosophical and anthropological doctrines do” 
(Markov, 1997). Besides, the critics of the theory 
of identity (and concepts similar to it) point to 
the fact that the naturalistic hypotheses yield to 
neither verification nor falsification at the present 
stage of science progress (Nagel, 1974, pp. 446-
447). Indeed, still nobody succeeded to catch 
the content of thought or feeling by means of 
neurobiology methods.
As for dualism, in our opinion, J. Fodor 
designates the main difficulty of this approach 
quite precisely: “The chief drawback of dualism 
is its failure to account adequately for mental 
causation. If the mind is nonphysical, it has no 
position in physical space. How, then, can a 
mental cause give rise to a behavioral effect that 
has a position in space? To put it another way, 
how can the nonphysical give rise to the physical 
without violating the laws of the conservation 
of mass, of energy and of momentum?” (Fodor, 
1981, p. 124).
Statement of the problem
It seems that the designated contradictions 
in both materialistic and dualistic approaches 
arise because these approaches are based on 
subject-object opposition, or, in other words, 
precise defusion of the outside objective world 
and the subjective image of this world arising 
in consciousness. However, as it will be shown 
further, concepts “subjective” and “objective”, 
being habitual and even intuitively clear, are 
not so obvious as it looks like and require the 
comprehension. In this case it is possible to agree 
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with T. Nagel’s critics of thinking conservatism 
of those philosophy mind agents who try “to 
reinterpret mental concepts so as to make them 
tractable parts of the framework of physical 
science” (Nagel, 1998, p. 347). According to 
Nagel, “a search for something more unfamiliar, 
something which starts from the conceptual 
unintelligibility, in its present form, of the 
subjective-objective link” is required instead 
(Nagel, 1998, p. 347). Following this intension, 
we suppose to uncover sense of the mind-body 
dualism irrelatively to traditionally understood 
subject-object opposition. This can be designated 
as the purpose of our research.
Theoretical framework
In this work we are guided by the ideas of 
nonclassical philosophy in which the classical 
subject-object opposition loses the dominating 
position. The characteristic tendency of its 
overcoming in nonclassical philosophy can 
be expressed, for example, by the following 
words of E. Husserl: “Everything in the world, 
everything in space and time is for me by virtue 
of my experiencing it, my perceiving it, my 
remembering it, my thinking about it in some 
way or another, my judging it, my valuing it, 
my desiring it, and so on. <…> I cannot move 
into any world, whether by living, experiencing, 
thinking, valuing or acting, except as it obtains 
its being and validity in me and from me myself” 
(Husserl, 1929/2003, p. 6). Such approach requires 
the construction of another ontology different 
from the classical subject-object opposition. 
Although subject-object opposition is strongly 
fixed in philosophical knowledge and still many 
philosophical theories are built on it, approach 
of nonclassical philosophy, according to which 
the subject and object are defined only in their 
interaction, seems more reliable to us. From this 
point of view until the interaction act with the 
world happened there is no pre-set (with already 
certain properties) subject of knowledge for 
whom the observed pre-set world is an external 
independent object. Such situation looks like it 
was described by I. A. Bondarenko: “Must be 
at least one creature executing this minimum of 
an inclusiveness and if such “included” creature 
took place, we are already in a certain world (in 
which something is possible, and something is 
already impossible). In other words, we are not in 
a space of potentially possible things, but in this 
(i.e. defined) world, so defined world (because we 
could be defined in a different way. In this sense 
the inquiring about the world in itself is pseudo-
inquiring)” (Bondarenko, 2002, p. 29).
Methods
The main philosophical method we use is 
the phenomenological method. Phenomenology 
is frequently interpreted as one of philosophical 
theories. In turn, we (as M. Heidegger) consider 
the phenomenology from another side – as 
methodological approach, realizing at the same 
time that the phenomenology isn’t only reduced 
to methodological procedure. In work “Being 
and Time” Heidegger emphasizes that “the 
expression “phenomenology” signifies primarily 
a concept of method. It does not characterize the 
“what” of the objects of philosophical research 
in terms of their content but the “how” of such 
research” (Heidegger, 1927/1996, p. 24). This 
“how” assumes, in fact, the researcher’s shift of 
attention from the perceived content to the event 
of perception something itself. Such change of 
attention is what they call the phenomenological 
reduction which allows to see phenomena (that is) 
with evidence.
Discussion 
As it was stated earlier, the mind-body 
problem is usually considered in terms of 
subject-object opposition. Indeed it is possible to 
agree with D. Hoffman asserting the following: 
– 2478 –
Dmitrii V. Konstantinov. The Mind-Body Problem: View Outside of the Subject-Object Opposition
practically all mind-body theories are based on the 
assumption that “a goal of perception is to match 
or approximate true properties of an objective 
physical environment” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 92). 
Hoffman calls this assumption the hypothesis 
of faithful depiction (HFD), emphasizing its 
prevalence. However, he doesn’t support this 
hypothesis and offers in exchange the concept 
of the multimodal user interface (MUI): “I 
propose that perception is like a multimodal user 
interface… A successful user interface does not, 
in general, resemble what it represents. Instead 
it dumbs down and reformats in a manner useful 
to the user. Because it simplifies, rather than 
resembles, a user interface usefully and swiftly 
informs the actions of the user. The features 
in an interface usually differ from those in the 
represented domain, with no loss of effectiveness” 
(Hoffman, 2008, pp. 93-94). Hoffman visually 
illustrates this idea by means of comparison of the 
human being perception with the computer use. 
For example, if one works with files, he doesn’t 
need to understand all complexity of the processes 
happening inside the computer. He deals only 
with the user interface which is “the total reality 
of the computer” for him (Hoffman, 2008, p. 
95). In other words, we make operations with the 
icons representing application or file. However 
these operations with the icons don’t seem at all 
those real processes which happen inside the 
computer. Similar with the perception, but in this 
case the real situation, unlike an example with 
the computer, is inaccessible to a human being 
at all. We are always inside the perception, and 
can’t look at perceived by someone’s eyes from 
the outside.
In this situation there is no sense to look 
for the mental basis in the physiology which is 
understood as something external for mental. 
Division into external and internal, objective 
and subjective is the abstraction convenient for 
science. However this abstraction doesn’t work if 
we try to speak about mental basis, i.e. we pass 
into ontology area. The subject-object opposition 
itself (as well as any scientific abstractions in 
general which we constitute by cogitative acts) is 
possible, because a lot of things have happened 
already. If one is thinking, he is already in the 
world available to perception and understanding – 
in the world which can be described by the means 
of language of the science. This “already” (being 
fixed in each mental act) can be conditionally 
designated as the event of proportionality of 
human being and world in which the first and 
the second are defined by a finite way and until 
it neither the human being, nor the world can’t be 
defined. The phrase “by a finite way” supposes 
here the existence of certain limitations which 
can’t be bypassed. The most important among 
such limitations is that the event of proportionality 
itself can’t be canceled. If one perceives this item 
as this item (for example, sees a cup as a cup), 
he is already irrevocably in the world in which 
this item is this item here and now, instead of 
something different. Any reasoning, whether this 
item is really this item with these properties out of 
one’s perception, doesn’t make sense. We already 
can’t consider the world out of human perception 
after the event of proportionality of human being 
and world have happened.
If we accept that any ontological description 
of mental states is possible when the act of 
proportionality of human being and world have 
happened already, then this position will lie 
out of the materialism, idealism or dualism in 
fact entering the subject-object opposition with 
the accent on one or another side. At first sight, 
the approach to the mind-body problem of D. 
Hoffman looks free from the subject-object 
opposition. Hoffman, explaining sense of the 
MUI theory, emphasizes: “MUI theory is not 
idealism. It does not claim that all that exists 
are conscious perceptions. It claims that our 
conscious perceptions need not resemble the 
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objective world, whatever its nature is” (Hoffman, 
2008, p. 100). However Hoffman offers another 
theory in further, calling it conscious realism. 
The conscious realism, according to Hoffman, 
perfectly complements the MUI theory, but we 
consider that the first contradicts the second. 
To see this, it is enough to pay attention to the 
following statement: “Conscious realism is a 
proposed answer to the question of what the 
universe is made of. Conscious realism asserts 
that the objective world, i.e., the world whose 
existence does not depend on the perceptions of a 
particular observer, consists entirely of conscious 
agents (italics of Hoffman. – D. K.)” (Hoffman, 
2008, p. 103). If to be the consistent adherent 
of the MUI theory and to understand different 
consciousnesses as conscious agents (Hoffman 
doesn’t explain this term actually), then it is not 
quite clear by what reason Hoffman can state 
this. It appears that he makes the same mistake 
as J. Berkley, when last one asserts that “all those 
bodies which compose the mighty frame of the 
world, have not any subsistence without a mind” 
(Berkley, 1710/1910, p. 32).
Wherein does our position differ from the 
position of Hoffman or solipsism of Berkley? The 
only way for us to speak about the world “whose 
existence does not depend on the perceptions of a 
particular observer” is rather a scepticism in the 
manner of Sextus Empiricus, i.e. abstention from 
judgments about it. Sextus Empiricus, speaking 
about the qualities of apple, builds the reasoning 
as follows: “Let us conceive of someone who 
from birth has touch, smell and taste, but who 
hears and sees nothing. He will suppose that 
there is absolutely nothing visible or audible, and 
that there exist only those three kinds of quality 
which he is able to grasp. So it is possible that 
we too, having only the five senses, grasp from 
among the qualities of the apple only those we are 
capable of grasping, although other qualities can 
exist, impressing other sense-organs in which we 
have no share, so that we do not grasp the objects 
perceptible by them” (Sextus Empiricus, about 
175/2000, pp. 26-27). It is obvious that instead 
of apple one can speak about any item here. And 
although at intuitive level the items of the world 
are thought as something external concerning to 
our perception, actually we don’t know, whether 
there is a world out of our consciousness and 
what this world is if it exists. That is why it is 
difficult for us to agree with the solution of the 
mind-body problem offered by D. Hoffman. 
There is nothing that would allow to claim with 
confidence, as Hoffman does, that “the brain 
does not cause conscious experience; instead, 
certain conscious agents, when so triggered 
by interactions with certain other systems of 
conscious agents, construct brains (and the rest 
of human anatomy) as complex icons of their 
MUIs” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 108). It appears that 
any scientific or philosophical reasoning on what 
structure preceding to a mental event generates 
this event, isn’t correct at all. One can speak 
more or less certain about his experience of 
consciousness only being in this experience that 
is directly endured at present as the actual event 
of his world (being fully honest, it is impossible 
to assert with confidence the possibility of 
consciousness experience for other human beings 
(Nagel, 1987, pp. 19-26)). The attempts to deduce 
this experience from something external don’t 
make sense – it isn’t expressed in the cause-effect 
relations (the cause-effect relations are the subject 
of science), it simply is.
How is it possible to interpret mental and 
physiological connection in this situation? The 
human physiology (as well as a sociality which is 
sometimes unfairly identified with spirituality), 
in our opinion, can be considered as a marker 
of happening of the event of proportionality of 
human being and world. It shows that the human 
being have been defined in this event exactly as 
the human being, it is the expression of those 
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limitations which are imposed on the human being 
by his dimension. Indeed, each sensible statement 
about the world (possible so far as the world and 
the human being have received the definiteness 
in the event of proportionality) supposes that the 
human being is biologically alive and socialized 
(is included in the social relations). This is that 
related to definiteness of the human being 
minimum which we have to include to any mental 
act description, because the state of biological 
death, experience of an animal or feral people are 
inaccessible to us and can’t be comprehended by 
us from within as own experience (the non-being 
situation). In turn, it is possible to consider space 
and time as a marker of definiteness of the world, 
as I. Kant. Kant speaks about it in “The Critique 
of Pure Reason”. It is possible to pay attention, 
for example, to his next phrase: “In the analytical 
part of the critique it is proved that space and time 
are only forms of sensible intuition, and therefore 
only conditions of the existence of the things as 
appearances” (Kant, 1781/1998, p. 115). Really, 
the spatio-temporal description of the world is 
included obviously or unobviously in any our 
sensible statement about it.
Let us note that it is not enough to have the 
only minimum designated above (the evidence 
that world and human being have been defined) 
for the ontological description of the mental act. 
Kant understood this perfectly, when he offers the 
terms “sensibility” and “understanding”: “Our 
cognition arises from two fundamental sources 
in the mind, the first of which is the reception of 
representations (the receptivity of impressions), 
the second the faculty for cognizing an object 
by means of these representations (spontaneity 
of concepts); through the former (sensibility. – 
D. K.) an object is given to us, through the latter 
(understanding. – D. K.) it is thought in relation to 
that representation (as a mere determination of the 
mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute 
the elements of all our cognition, so that neither 
concepts without intuition corresponding to them 
in some way nor intuition without concepts can 
yield a cognition” (Kant, 1781/1998, p. 193). 
Actually Kant says here that in every act of 
perception two events are realized simultaneously 
(not in a sequence): event itself and its content. 
In other words, we, firstly, perceive something, 
a certain seeming (what is possible if human 
being and world are already defined, i.e. the act 
of proportionality of human being and world 
have happened). Secondly, we perceive this as 
this, i.e. some content is present. The content is 
always related to a certain idea. Ideas, in its turn, 
can be subdivided into two classes. To the first 
we will attribute the ideas which are the result of 
generalization of preceding experience and which 
give an opportunity to speak in an ordered way 
about the phenomena of the surrounding world. 
To see a cup as a cup, it is necessary to have the 
knowledge about a cup, the idea of a cup. This 
knowledge has additional character in relation to 
perceived, is not brought out of it.
But there are also ideas of another sort – 
those that give an opportunity to the human 
being to newly re-create himself each time in 
the complete and ordered state. These ideas 
organize human life as human one, they are 
initiated by culture, but they are not a result 
of generalization. Such are a conscience, 
good, moral, love and the similar phenomena 
for which there are no external reasons – here 
the basis of a phenomenon coincide with the 
phenomenon itself. For example, conscience is 
not a property of the human being or the world, 
it can’t be set through reflexive generalization of 
empirical acts of the human being. Conscience 
is what allows to see. If a human being is not 
in space of conscience, doesn’t feel remorse, he 
doesn’t see injustice of his act. Thus conscience 
can’t exists yesterday and can’t exist tomorrow, 
it exists just now, and all at once (there can’t be 
a part of a conscience). Yesterday act in good 
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conscience doesn’t mean act in good conscience 
at present. One is compelled to aim each time 
by own effort to be set in space of conscience 
(good, love, thought etc.) newly.
So, human physiology (including work of 
human brain) is the only side which characterizes 
the minimum of life of consciousness, it is the 
marker of human being and world are defined now. 
We are always after this definiteness (or, more 
precisely, inside it) when we perceive events of 
the world, and one shouldn’t search the conditions 
of any event of life of consciousness (the point 
of interests of ontology) neither in biology nor 
in sociality. Every conscious act is complete and 
self-sufficient, and the consciousness basis (being 
actually the basis of human being) can be found 
only in consciousness. That is why we agree with 
M. Heidegger asserting the following: “Body, 
soul, spirit might designate areas of phenomena 
which are thematically separable for the sake 
of determinate investigations; within certain 
limits their ontological indeterminancy might 
not be so important. But in the question of the 
being of human being, this cannot be summarily 
calculated in terms of the kinds of being of body, 
soul, and spirit which have yet first to be defined. 
And even for an ontological attempt which is to 
proceed in this way, some idea of the being of the 
whole would have to be presupposed” (Heidegger, 
1927/1996, p. 45). In our opinion, the use of 
subject-object opposition destroys this wholeness 
and doesn’t allow to get closer to understanding 
of the being of thought.
Conclusion
Summarizing the result, it is possible to say 
the following. The mind-body problem as the 
problem of interrelation and interconditionality of 
mental and physiological arises when one proceeds 
from the classical subject-object opposition. 
Accepting the subject-object opposition as the 
convenient way for a scientist to speak about the 
phenomena of this world (the way that shouldn’t 
be equal to the world itself), it is already senseless 
to look for the reason of a mental event out of 
this event. Mental states are not the data of sense 
organs received from somewhere outside and 
processed by a brain (which also plays a part 
of something separate and independent from 
conscious act), it is the phenomena understood 
by themselves. Heidegger was right when said 
that the “ontological foundations can never be 
disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived 
from empirical material. Rather, they are always 
already “there” even when that empirical material 
is only collected” (Heidegger, 1927/1996, p. 46). 
Life is understood by the life itself, the being is 
reflected only when we already are in the being.
A sсeptic could object here: we can injure 
the certain lobes of a brain of another human 
being and see evidently that he is deprived of 
opportunity to think and understand now. But 
what does allow to declare it responsibly, except 
the external manifestations observed by us? 
We never were into the similar states, they are 
impenetrable for us at all. T. Nagel characterizes 
the similar situation when he writes: “…The 
subjective character of the experience of a person 
deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for 
example, nor presumably is mine to him” (Nagel, 
1974, p. 440). And herein it is possible to agree 
with him. However, the assumption that other 
people can really have consciousness experience 
which is similar to mine, is a quite appropriate 
in a certain situation. This assumption can’t be 
subjected to verification or falsification, however 
in a philosophical discourse it is admissible and 
even necessary. Such assumption allows me to 
treat the other as human being (alive, feeling, 
experiencing), so to keep human in myself.
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Проблема психофизиологического дуализма:  
взгляд вне субъектно-объектной оппозиции
Д.В. Константинов
Сибирский государственный университет 
физической культуры и спорта 
Россия, 644009, Омск, ул. Масленникова, 144
Решение проблемы психофизиологического дуализма как проблемы взаимосвязи и 
взаимообусловленности ментального и физиологического приводит к противоречиям, если 
исходить из классического субъект-объектного противопоставления. Если же принять, что 
субъект-объектная оппозиция – это просто удобный для учёного способ говорения об явлениях 
этого мира, который не надо отождествлять с миром, то причину ментального события 
уже бессмысленно искать в физиологическом или социальном. Сама субъектно-объектная 
оппозиция возможна тогда, когда уже произошло событие соразмерности человека и мира – 
событие, в котором человек и мир определяются конечным образом и до которого ни человек, 
ни мир не могут быть определены. Маркером такой определённости со стороны человека и 
является его физиология (как и социальность, которую порой неоправданно отождествляют 
с духовностью), это минимум бытия сознания. Однако помимо этого минимума есть и 
другая сторона. Действительно, в каждом акте восприятия реализовано одномоментно (не в 
последовательности) два события: восприятие некой явленности (что возможно, если человек 
и мир уже определены, т. е. произошёл акт соразмерности человека и мира) и какого-то 
содержания. Содержание всегда связано с определённой идеей. Идеи, в свою очередь, можно 
подразделить на два класса. К первому мы относим то, что является результатом обобщения 
предшествующего опыта и даёт возможность упорядоченным образом говорить о явлениях 
окружающего мира. В свою очередь, ко второй группе можно отнести те идеи, которые 
дают возможность человеку каждый раз заново воссоздавать в целостном и упорядоченном 
виде самого себя. Эти идеи организуют человеческую жизнь в качестве человеческой, 
они инициируются культурой, но они – не результат обобщения. Таковы совесть, добро, 
нравственность, любовь и тому подобные феномены, для которых нет внешних причин – здесь 
условия вещи совпадают с самой вещью.
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Итак, биологическое в человеке (в том числе работа его мозга) – это лишь та сторона, 
которая характеризует минимум бытия сознания, это маркер того, что человек и мир 
теперь определены. Мы, воспринимая события мира, всегда находимся уже после этой 
определённости (или, точнее сказать, в ней), и причины любого события жизни сознания 
(сфера интересов онтологии) следует искать уже отнюдь не в биологии или социальности. 
Каждый сознательный акт целостен и самодостаточен, и основания сознания (являющиеся 
фактически основаниями человека) можно найти только в самом сознании.
Ключевые слова: проблема психофизиологического дуализма, субъектно-объектная оппозиция, 
бытие сознания.
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